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This paper empirically assesses the performance of interest-rate monetary rules for
interdependent economies characterized by model uncertainty. We set out a two-bloc
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with habit persistence (that generates
output persistence), Calvo pricing and wage-setting with indexing of non-optimized
prices and wages (generating inﬂation persistence), incomplete ﬁnancial markets and
the incomplete pass-through of exchange rate changes. We estimate a linearized form
of the model by Bayesian maximum-likelihood methods using US and Euro-zone data.
From the estimates of the posterior distributions we then examine monetary policy
conducted both independently and cooperatively by the Fed and the ECB in the
form of robust inﬂation-targeting interest-rate rules. Comparing the utility outcome
in a closed-loop Nash equilibrium with the outcome from a coordinated design of
policy rules, we ﬁnd a new result: the gains from monetary policy coordination rise
signiﬁcantly when CPI inﬂation targeting interest-rate rules are designed to account
for model uncertainty.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
Keywords: monetary policy coordination, robustness, inﬂation-targeting
interest-rate rules.
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The emergence of the new micro-founded open-economy models (NOEM) has led naturally
for the literature to revisit the economics of monetary policy interdependence. Following
the seminal contribution of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), a number of papers have stud-
ied spillover eﬀects and the resulting gains from policy coordination for interdependent
economies using a rudimentary NOEM (e.g., Betts and Devereux (2000), Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002), Clarida et al. (2002a), Benigno and Benigno
(2003)). A consensus emerging from this body of work is that the coordination gains are
very small.
Our paper belongs to a more recent literature that reassesses the no gains result using
a more developed NOEM. We examine inﬂation-targeting monetary rules that are robust
in the face of model uncertainty and are operational in the sense that a zero-lower-bound
(henceforth, ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate is observed. We develop a
two-bloc NOEM with traded and non-traded sectors, habit persistence (that generates
output persistence in the model), Calvo pricing with indexing of non-optimized prices
(generating inﬂation persistence), imperfect ﬁnancial markets and the incomplete pass-
through of exchange rate changes. Wage stickiness is introduced using an analogous form of
staggered wage setting. We estimate a linearized form of the model by Bayesian maximum-
likelihood methods using US and Euro-zone data.1
We ﬁrst assess the gains from coordination in the absence of model uncertainty. Both
cooperative and non-cooperative optimized IFB targeting rules are computed. Compar-
isons between the outcomes under these two sets of rules provide an empirical assessment
of the coordination gains. As in Batini et al. (2005), Batini et al. (2006) and Levine et al.
(2008), we then proceed to use the estimated posterior densities of parameters to design
IFB rules that are robust in two senses: they guarantee stable and unique equilibria for all
parameter combinations and, in addition, use the posterior parameter density functions
to minimize an expected loss function of the central bank subject to this estimated model
uncertainty.2
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: section 2 describes our model, the steady
1Coenen et al. (2007) set out a similar model, but without non-traded sectors. In a calibrated model
they ﬁnd only small gains, of the order of a 0.05% permanent increase in steady-state consumption.
2We assume model consistent expectations throughout in the sense that two monetary authorities and
the private sector all agree on the ‘true’ model drawn from the distribution. Frankel and Rockett (1988)
and Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1992) study policy coordination where the central banks may believe
in diﬀerent models. Levine et al. (2008) examine policy rules in a single economy where the private sector
and the central bank may believe in diﬀerent models.
1state and the linearization about the latter.3 Section 3 describes the estimation method-
ology and results. Sections 4 and 5 describes our procedures for approximating the op-
timization problems in a linear-quadratic form and for imposing an approximate ZLB
constraint. Section 6 provides results for optimized IFB rules where model parameters
are known with certainty. Section 7 tackles the case where there is parameter uncertainty
and inﬂation-targeting rules are designed to be robust. Section 8 summarizes our main
results.
2 The Model
There are two asymmetric unequally-sized blocs with the diﬀerent household preferences
and technologies. In each bloc there are traded and non-traded sectors and the relative
size of the sectors can diﬀer. The model is set up so as to incorporate two large blocs
and a small open economy embedded in a world economy within one framework. We
ﬁrst assume complete asset markets before modifying the model to incorporate imperfect
markets. The exchange rate is perfectly ﬂexible. The consumption index in each bloc
is of Dixit-Stiglitz nested CES form with domestic and foreign components consisting of
a basket of diﬀerentiated goods produced in each bloc. Goods producers and household
suppliers of labor have monopolistic power. Wages and nominal domestic prices of both
domestically produced and imported goods are sticky. Following Devereux and Engel
(2002) we introduce heterogenity in the way goods are exported. Some ﬁrms are local
currency pricers (LCPs) and market directly to the overseas markets which creates a
departure from the law of one price. Other ﬁrms are producer currency pricers (PCPs,)
setting prices in their own currency. To keep the model at manageable ‘medium’ size
(and in common with much of the New Keynesian DSGE literature) labour is the only
input. Apart from this feature, as each bloc tends to its closed economy limit and we shut
down the open-economy aspects it resembles the single closed economy model of Smets
and Wouters (2003a), but without capital.4
3Levine et al. (2007a) gives a fuller description of the model, its estimation and simulation properties.
4It follows that ‘consumption’ should in fact be interpreted as total private expenditure with the risk
aversion parameter, σ interpreted accordingly (see Woodford (2003), page 352.)
22.1 Households
There are ν households in the ‘home’ bloc and ν∗ households in the ‘foreign’ bloc. A












where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t, β is the
household’s discount factor, UC,t, UM,t and UL,t are preference shocks Ct(r) is an index
of consumption, Lt(r) are hours worked, HC,t represents the habit in consumption, or




r=1 Ct(r) is the average consumption index, h ∈ [0,1). When h = 0, σ > 1 is the
risk aversion parameter (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution)5.
Mt(r) are end-of-period nominal money balances and Gt is exogenous per capita real
government spending assumed to be exclusively on non-traded domestic output. An anal-
ogous symmetric intertemporal utility is deﬁned for the ‘foreign’ representative household
and the corresponding variables (such as consumption) are denoted by C∗
t (r), etc.
The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
PtCt(r) + Et[Qt,t+1Dt+1(r)] + Mt(r) = (1 − Tt)Wt(r)Lt(r) + Dt(r) + Mt−1(r)
+ (1 − Tt)Γt(r) + TRt (2)
where Pt is a Dixit-Stiglitz price index deﬁned in (17) below, Dt+1(r) is a random variable
denoting the payoﬀ of the portfolio purchased at time t and Qt,t+1, the stochastic discount
factor, is the period-t price of an asset that pays one unit of domestic currency in a
particular state of period t + 1 divided by the probability of an occurrence of that state
given information available in period t. Wt(r) is the wage rate, Tt the income tax rate
and Γt(r) are dividends from ownership of ﬁrms.6 Finally TRt are lump-sum transfers to
households by the government net of lump-sum taxes
Assume the existence of nominal one-period riskless bonds denominated in domestic
currency with nominal interest rate It over the interval [t,t + 1]. Then arbitrage consid-
erations imply that Et[Qt,t+1] = 1
1+It. In addition, if we assume that households’ labour
supply is diﬀerentiated with elasticity of supply η, then (as we shall see below) the demand
5When h  = 0, σ is merely an index of the curvature of the utility function.
6The tax rate Tt can be interpreted as a total tax wedge (see Levine et al. (2006)).











r=1 Wt(r)1−η  1










are the average wage
index and average employment respectively.7
Let the number of diﬀerentiated traded goods produced in the home and foreign blocs
be nH and nF respectively and the number of diﬀerentiated non-traded goods be nN and
n∗
N respectively. Let n = nH +nN and n∗ = nF +n∗
N be the corresponding total numbers
of goods in the two blocs. Each good is produced by a single ﬁrm and we assume that the
the ratio of households to ﬁrms are the same in each bloc, i.e., ν
n = ν∗
n∗. It follows that n
and n∗ (or ν and ν∗) are measures of size. Then the per capita consumption index in the
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where CN,t(f,r) denotes the home consumption of the non-traded good of household r,
CH,t(f,r) and CF,t(f,r) denote the home consumption of traded variety f produced in
blocs H and F respectively, ζN and ζT are the elasticities of substitution between varieties
7Note that if we normalize ν = 1 then as is more customary in the literature we can write Wt ≃




1−η . However here we need to impose diﬀerent sized blocs with the foreign number of
households ν
∗  = ν.
4in each bloc (note that we impose equality between blocs for the traded elasticity, i.e.,
ζ∗
T = ζT), and
w =
nHω
nHω + nF(1 − ω)
(9)
In (9) ω ∈ [1
2,1] is a parameter that captures the degree of ‘bias’ in the home bloc. If
ω = 1 we have autarky, while the lower extreme of ω = 1
2 gives us the case of perfect
integration. If blocs are of equal size then nH = nF, w = ω and consumption only
favours home consumption if there is home bias.8 In the absence of home bias w =
nH
nH+nF
and domestic/foreign consumption decisions depend only on relative size. As   → 1 and
wN → 0 we approach a one-sector model with a Cobb-Douglas utility function Ct(r) =
CT,t(r) = w−w(1 − w)−(1−w)CH,t(r)wCF,t(r)1−w as in Clarida et al. (2002b).
If PH,t(f), PF,t(f) are the prices in domestic currency of the good produced by ﬁrm



































where aggregate price indices for domestic and foreign consumption bundles of traded





































8The eﬀect of home bias in open economies is also studied in Corsetti et al. (2002) and De Fiore and
Liu (2002).
5and the aggregate price indices PT,t and Pt are given by
PT,t = UROW,t
 




wN(PN,t)1−  + (1 − wN)(PT,t)1−   1
1−  (17)
where UROW,t is a price shock arising from trade with the rest of the world. Aggregate
nominal consumption is then given by
PtCt = PT,tCT,t + PN,tCN,t = PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t + PN,tCN,t (18)
We now need to distinguish between the pricing decisions of PCP and LCP ﬁrms. Let
a proportion θ of home ﬁrms export their goods as PCPs and the remaining proportion
1 − θ as LCPs. Similarly a proportion of foreign ﬁrms θ∗ are PCPs and 1 − θ are LCPs.





































The existence of a distributors of imports and local currency pricing means that the
law of one price does not hold i.e. aggregate prices of traded goods in home and foreign
blocs are linked by ΦH,t =
StP ∗
H,t
PH,t  = 1 and ΦF,t =
StP ∗
F,t
PF,t  = 1 necessarily, where P∗
H,t and
P∗
F,t are the foreign currency prices of the home and foreign-produced goods and St is the
nominal exchange rate. Let
P∗




+ (1 − w∗)(P∗
H,t)1− ∗  1
1− ∗
(22)
be the foreign aggregate traded price index corresponding to (16). Then it follows that
aggregate relative traded prices
StP ∗
T,t
PT,t , the ‘real exchange rate’ for traded goods, and the
terms of trade, deﬁned as the domestic currency relative price of imports to exports,
Tt =
PF,t




















6Thus if the law of one price holds for diﬀerentiated goods; i.e., ΦH,t = ΦF,t = 1, and   =  ∗,
then the law of one price applies to the aggregate traded price indices iﬀ w∗ = 1−w. The




PT,t rises) as the terms of trade improves.
For later use we require the the CPI real exchange rate RERt ≡
StP ∗
t
Pt . The two real
exchange rates are related as follows. Let Nt =
PN,t
PT,t be the relative price of non-traded
to traded goods in the home bloc with an analogous deﬁnition of N ∗


























Now consider the consumption, money demand and labour supply decisions of the
representative household. We ﬁrst consider the case of ﬂexible wages. Then maximizing
(58) subject to (2) and (3), treating habit as exogenous, and imposing symmetry on






































t are the marginal utility of consumption, money holdings
and the marginal disutility of work respectively. Taking expectations of (25) we arrive at
the following familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule:










In (26), the demand for money balances depends positively on consumption relative to
habit and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Given the central bank’s setting of the
latter and ignoring seignorage in the government budget constraint, (26) is completely
recursive to the rest of the system describing our macro-model and will be ignored in the
rest of the paper. In (27) the real disposable wage is proportional to the marginal rate





, this constant of proportionality
reﬂecting the market power of households that arises from their monopolistic supply of a
diﬀerentiated factor input with elasticity η.
72.2 Domestic Producers
In the domestic goods non-traded and trade sectors, each good diﬀerentiated good f is












≡ Ai,tLi,t(f) ; i = N,T (29)
where Li,t(f,r) is the labour input of type r by ﬁrm f in sector i and Ai,t is an exogenous
shock capturing shifts to trend total factor productivity in this sector. Minimizing costs
 ν






Li,t(f) ; i = N,T (30)
and aggregating over ﬁrms leads to the demand for labor as shown in (3).9 Per capita
aggregate outputs in the home bloc is given by
Yi,t = Ai,tLi,t ; i = N,T (31)
where Yi,t and Li,t are aggregated as for consumption aggregates CN,t(r) and CH,t(r) in
(5) and (7), respectively.
In a equilibrium of equal households, all wages adjust to the same level Wt. For later
analysis it is useful to deﬁne the real marginal cost (MC) as the wage relative to domestic
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for the traded and non-traded sectors respectively.
Turning to price-setting in the traded sector, we assume that there is a probability
of 1 − ξH at each period that the price of each good f is set optimally to ˆ PH,t(f). If
the price is not re-optimized, then it is indexed to last period’s aggregate producer price
inﬂation.10 With indexation parameter γH ≥ 0, this implies that successive prices with no
9Note that in a symmetric equilibrium of identical ﬁrms and households, total demand for labour of type
r by ﬁrms in the traded sector is LT,t(r) =
 nH





nHLT,t(f) = νLT,t(r). Similarly nNLN,t(f) = νLN,t(r). Such a symmetric equilibrium applies to the
ﬂexi-price case of our model, but not to the sticky-price case where, at each point in time, some ﬁrms are
locked into price and wage contracts, but others are re-optimizing these contracts.
10Thus we can interpret
1
1−ξH as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.



























where Qt,t+k is the discount factor over the interval [t,t + k], subject to a common11
downward sloping demand from domestic consumers and foreign importers of elasticity ζT




























+ (1 − ξH)( ˆ PH,t+1(f))1−ζT (36)




























+ (1 − ξN)( ˆ PN,t+1(f))1−ζN (38)
2.3 Exchange Rate Pass-Through
The home bloc consumer purchases imported goods either via distributors who import
foreign diﬀerentiated goods for which the law of one price holds, or directly from the
producer. The ﬁrst range of varieties produced by the PCP foreign ﬁrms have aggregate
price P
p
F,t given by (19) and the second range produced by LCP ﬁrms Pℓ
F,t given by (20).
2.3.1 PCP Importers
For good f imported by the home bloc from PCP foreign ﬁrms the price P
p
F,t(f), set by








11Note that we impose a symmetry condition ζT = ζ
∗
T; i.e., the elasticity of substitution between diﬀer-
entiated goods produced in any one bloc is the same for consumers in both blocs.
92.3.2 LCP Exporters
Price setting in export markets by domestic LCP exporters follows is a very similar fashion
to domestic pricing. Note that non-optimized prices are indexed to last period’s aggregate
imported price inﬂation in the LCP distribution sector. The optimal price in units of
domestic currency is ˆ Pℓ









































+ (1 − ξH)( ˆ P∗ℓ
H,t+1(f))1−ζT (40)
Price setting of Pℓ
F by foreign LCP exporters follows in an analogous way. Table 1
summarizes the notation used.










F = StP ∗
F P ℓ
F  = StP ∗
F
Table 1. Notation for Prices
2.4 Staggered Wage-Setting
We introduce wage stickiness in an analogous way. There is a probability 1−ξW that the
wage rate of a household of type r is set optimally at ˆ Wt(r). If the wage is not re-optimized
then it is indexed to last period’s CPI inﬂation. With a wage indexation parameter











,     . The household of type r at time t then chooses W0


















Pt is the real marginal utility of consumption income and Lt(r) is

























Note that as ξw → 0 and wages become perfectly ﬂexible, only the ﬁrst term in the
summation in (41) counts and we then have the result (27) obtained previously. By










+ (1 − ξw)( ˆ Wt+1(r))1−η (43)
2.5 The Equilibrium
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating the
supply and demand of the home consumer good and assuming that exogenous government
expenditure goes exclusively on non-traded goods we obtain





YN,t = CN,t + Gt (45)
Lt = LT,t + LN,t (46)
Fiscal policy is rudimentary: a balanced government budget constraint12





H,t + PN,tYN,t) ≡ Tt GDPt (47)
where GDPt is nominal GDP, completes the model. As in Coenen et al. (2005) we further
assume that changes in government spending are ﬁnanced exclusively by changes in lump-
sum taxes with the tax rates Tt, held constant at its steady-state value.
Given nominal interest rates It,I∗
t the money supply is ﬁxed by the central banks to
accommodate money demand. By Walras’ Law we can dispense with the bond market
equilibrium condition. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned at t = 0 as stochastic sequences
Ct, CHt, CFt, CN,t, PHt, PN,t, PFt, Pt, Mt, Wt, YH,t, YN,t, Lt, LN,t, LT,t, P0
Ht, 16 foreign
12In this cashless economy, we ignore seignorage and consistent with this we later ignore the utility from
money balances in the household welfare function.
11counterparts C∗
t , etc, RERt, RERT,t, Nt and Tt, given past price indices and exogenous
processes UC,t, UM,t, UL,t, AN,t, AT,t, TRt, Gt and foreign counterparts.


























. Then assuming identical holdings of initial wealth in the two blocs,
(48) implies that zt+1 = zt = z0 where initial relative consumption in prices denominated










2.6 Financial Market Incompleteness
We now modify our model to allow for incomplete ﬁnancial markets, to incorporate foreign
debt dynamics without inducing non-stationarity. We assume there is no inter-bloc trade
in state-contingent bonds so that risk-sharing between blocs no longer applies. There is
however a full set of state-contingent bonds within each bloc so the marginal utilities of
consumption are equated across households at all dates and states of nature in each bloc.
Therefore we can assume a representative household for each bloc. Following Benigno
(2001) there are two risk-free one-period bonds denominated in the currencies of each













where φ( ) captures the cost in the form of a risk premium for home households to hold
foreign bonds. We assume φ(0) = 0 and φ′ < 0.
For analytical convenience only the home households can hold foreign bonds. Then
net foreign assets in the home bloc equals holdings of foreign assets, BF,t. Assuming a
13(49) is the risk-sharing condition for consumption, because it equates marginal rate of substitution
to relative price, as would be obtained if utility were being jointly maximized by a social planner (see
Sutherland (2002)). Note that (28) and (49) together imply the stochastic UIP condition (see Benigno and
Benigno (2001)).
12cashless economy, for the home bloc the household budget constraint for household r now
becomes
PtCt(r) + PB,tBH,t(r) + P∗
B,tStBF,t(r) = (1 − Tt)Wt(r)Lt(r) + BH,t−1(r) + St−1BF,t−1(r)
+ (1 − Tt)Γt(r) + TRt (52)
Maximizing (58) subject to (52) and (3), treating habit as exogenous, and imposing sym-
metry on households as before gives the following ﬁrst-order conditions for holdings of













































r=1 BF,t(r) = νBF,t are the net holdings by the household sector of foreign
bonds. Summing over the household budget constraints and subtracting (47), we arrive
at the national resource identity describing the accumulation of net foreign assets
P∗
B,tStBF,t = St−1BF,t−1 + WtLt + Γt − PtCt − PH,tGt ≡ St−1BF,t−1 + TBt (56)
where, noting that national income WtLt + Γt = GDPt, TBt = GDPt − PtCt − PN,tGt is




H,t − νPF,tCF,t (57)
2.7 Specialization of the Utility Function























where u(Gt) is the utility from exogenous per capita government spending Gt.
13Before proceeding it is informative at this point to discuss an alternative choice of
utility function is non-separable in consumption, labour eﬀort and money balances. The
former feature allows the model to be consistent with the balanced growth path (henceforth
BGP) set out in previous sections. As pointed out in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004),
chapter 9, section 9.3, this requires a careful choice of the form of the utility as a function
of consumption and labour eﬀort. Again it is achieved by a utility function which is





Φ(r)1−̺t(1 − Lt(r))̺t 1−σ
1 − σ
(59)
where eﬀort is measured as a proportion of a day, normalized at unity, and

























The utility function (59) has a number of notable features. First, UC,M > 0 iﬀ σθ > 1
in which case money holdings and consumption are complements. Second, UΦL > 0 so
that private and public consumption, and money holdings together, and leisure (equal to
(1 − Lt(r)) are substitutes. Third, it leads to a non-zero Ramsey steady-state inﬂation
rate. Finally, a BGP requires that the real wage and consumption grow at the same rate





is constant at the BGP growth
steady state. The implications of this alternative form of utility function is left to further
research.
2.8 The Steady State
A deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state, denoted by variables without the time sub-
scripts, with Et−1(UC,t) = 1, Et−1(UL,t) = κ, a zero trade balance TB = 0 and zero net



























































1 = β(1 + I) (72)
YT = ATLT (73)
YN = ANLN (74)
L = LT + LN (75)







































PC + PNG + TB
(83)
















+ 1 − w∗  1
1− ∗






H − νPFCF = 0 (88)
It should be noted that in the steady state the law of one price holds for each diﬀeren-
tiated good and for aggregate traded prices. We now have gives 47 equations to determine
the steady state of 49 endogenous variables: C, CH, CF, CN, CT, P, PT, PN, W, LT, LN,
L, R, YT, YN, PH = ˆ PH, PF = ˆ PF, ΦF, P
p
F, Pℓ
F, T, 21 foreign counterparts C∗ etc, T , N,
S, RERT and RER given G and TR.
To pin down price levels we need to re-introduce money equate money demand and
its foreign counterpart with exogenously set money supplies in the two blocs, which then
gives us a determinate steady state of the model. It is convenient to assume that money
supplies in our steady state are set so as to result in S = 1 and dispense with the money
demand equations. Furthermore, as is standard in general equilibrium models, we choose
units of output appropriately so that prices of the two non-traded goods, and those of the
traded goods in their own currencies are unity; i.e, PN = P∗
N = PH = P∗
F = 1. With this
normalization and the fact that the law of one price holds in the steady state, we have
that P = P
p
F = Pℓ
F = PF = PT = N = T = RERT = 1. Similarly for the foreign bloc
P∗ = P
∗ p
H = P∗ ℓ
H = P∗
H = P∗
T = 1 and therefore RER = 1. Thus in the steady state we
can normalize all prices at unity, an extremely convenient property when it comes to the
linearization.14
2.9 Linearization and State-Space Representation
We now linearize around a baseline and, in general, asymmetric, steady state in which
consumption, output, employment and prices in the two blocs are constant. Then inﬂation
is zero. Output is then at its ineﬃcient natural rate studied in the previous section and
the nominal rate of interest is given by (72). Deﬁne all lower case variables as proportional
deviations from this baseline steady state except for rates of change which are absolute
deviations.15
14Note that with a retail sector introducing an extra LCP mark-up, as in Monacelli (2003), PPP and
this convenient normalization of all prices no longer holds in the steady state (see Batini et al. (2005)).






where X is the baseline steady state. For
variables expressing a rate of change over time such as rt and πt, xt = Xt − X. Levine et al. (2007a)



























where zt is a vector of predetermined variables and xt is a vector of non-predetermined or
‘jump’ variables.
3 Calibration and Estimation
3.1 Econometric Strategy
Traditionally, DSGE models are calibrated such that certain theoretical moments given
by the model match as closely as possible their empirical counterparts.16 However, this
method lacks formal statistical foundations (Kim and Pagan, 1994)) and makes testing
the results diﬃcult.17
Following Sargent (1989), and preceding the Bayesian literature, the common praxis
was to estimate DSGE models with maximum-likelihood (ML). For instance Kim and
Pagan (1994) analyzes the eﬀects of taxation in an estimated business cycle model and
Leeper and Sims (1994) and Kim (2000) estimated DSGE models for the analysis of
monetary policy. Well known problems arising with this method are that parameters take
on corner solutions or implausible values, and that the likelihood function may be ﬂat in
some dimensions. GMM estimation is a popular alternative for estimating intertemporal
models (see (Gal´ ı and Gertler, 1999)) . However , Christiano and Haan (1996) has shown
by estimating a business cycle model on U.S. data that GMM estimators often do not
have the distributions implied by asymptotic theory. In addition, Lind´ e (2005) ﬁnds that
parameters in a simple New Keynesian model are likely to be estimated imprecisely and
with bias.
provide full details of this linearization.
16For an overview see Favero (2001).
17See, however, Canova and Ortega (2000) for a discussion on how testing in calibrated DSGE models
could be conducted.
17The Bayesian approach taken in this paper follows work by DeJong et al. (2000b,a),
Otrok (2001), and Smets and Wouters (2003b). There are by now numerous applications
of the approach, for example Adolfson et al. (2005), Adolfson et al. (2007), Justiniano and
Preston (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Rabanal and Rubio-Ram´ ırez (2005),
and can be seen as a combination of likelihood methods and the calibration methodology.
Bayesian analysis allows formally incorporating uncertainty and prior information regard-
ing the parametrization of the model by combining the likelihood with a prior density for
the parameters of interest. The moments of the prior density can be based on results from
earlier microeconometric or macroeconometric studies, that is appropriate values could be
employed as the means or modes of the prior density, while a priori uncertainty can be
expressed by choosing the appropriate prior variance. For example, the restriction that
AR(1)-coeﬃcients lie within the unit interval can be implemented by choosing a prior
density that covers only that interval, such as a truncated normal or a beta density. This
strategy may help to mitigate numerical problems stemming e.g. from a ﬂat likelihood
function as estimates of the maximum likelihood are pulled towards values that the re-
searcher would consider sensible a priori. This eﬀect will be stronger when the data carry
little information about a certain parameter, that is the likelihood is relatively ﬂat whereas
the eﬀect will only be moderate when the likelihood is very peaked.
By Bayes’ theorem, the posterior density ϕ(ξ | Y ) is related to prior and likelihood as
follows
ϕ(ξ | Y ) =
f(Y | ξ)π(ξ)
f(Y )
∝ f(Y | ξ)π(ξ) = L(ξ | Y )π(ξ),
where π(ξ) denotes the prior density of the parameter vector ξ, L(ξ | Y ) ≡ f(Y | ξ) is
the likelihood of the sample Y and f(Y ) =
 
f(Y | ξ)π(ξ)dξ is the unconditional sample
density. The unconditional sample density does not depend on the unknown parameters
and consequently serves only as a proportionality factor that can be neglected for estima-
tion purposes. In this context it becomes clear that the main diﬀerence between ‘classical’
and Bayesian statistics is a matter of conditioning. Likelihood-based non-Bayesian meth-
ods condition on the unknown parameters ξ and compare f(Y | ξ) with the observed
data. Bayesian methods condition on the observed data and use the full distribution
f(ξ,Y ) = f(Y | ξ)π(ξ) and require speciﬁcation of a prior density π(ξ).
Computation of the posterior distribution ϕ(ξ | Y ) requires calculating the likelihood
18and then multiplying by the prior density. The likelihood function can be computed
with the Kalman ﬁlter using the state-space representation of the solution to the rational
expectations model.
We proceed in two steps: Parameters that are not identiﬁed or diﬃcult to estimate
are calibrated based on earlier studies, evidence from micro data or where applicable on
sample averages. The other model parameters are estimated using the Bayesian approach.
following, by now, well-known work of DeJong et al. (2000a,b), Otrok (2001), Smets and
Wouters (2003c, 2004), and in particular for the open economy by Adolfson et al. (2004).18
This allows us to express our subjective believes about these parameters in a statistical
coherent way and update them with the data used. Further, due to the complexity of the
model we ﬁrst estimate a version of the model where all goods are traded thus eliciting a
prior for the full model with traded and non-traded goods.
We estimate these models on a set of 15 time series: real GDP, real consumption
expenditure, hours worked, the GDP-deﬂator, consumer prices, nominal wages, nominal
interest rates and the euro-dollar exchange rate, where we take the euro area as the home
country and express the exchange rate in euros per dollar, so that a rising exchange rate
implies a depreciation of the euro. The real variables are expressed in per capita terms. We
use data from 1980q1 to 2005q4, where the ﬁrst four years are used to initialize the state of
the Kalman ﬁlter. For the US the data stems from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
database (FRED), worked hours and hourly compensation have been retrieved from the
Bureau of Labour Statistics. For the euro area the data is taken from the ECB database
ﬁrst compiled by Fagan et al. (2001). The exchange rate is obtained from EcoWinPro.
For the euro area there is no long time series on worked hours available. We use
employment instead and add the following measurement equation to the system
emplt = emplt−1 + Etemplt+1 − emplt +
(1 − βξe)(1 − ξe)
ξe
(nt − emplt),
where empl denotes employment. The idea is that employment reacts more sluggishly in
response to macroeconomic shocks than hours worked
The data is pre-ﬁltered such that we remove means and linear trends in order to obtain
stationary series. However, the exchange rate is measured in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
18See also Justiniano and Preston (2004) and Rabanal and Tuesta (2006).
193.2 Calibrated Parameters
The set of parameters is split into a set of calibrated parameters that are diﬃcult to
estimate because they are linked to steady state conditions or because we think that we
have very good a priori information about them, e.g. the Calvo contract lengths. The other
set contains estimated parameters mainly pertaining to model dynamics and stochastic
properties.
We discuss the set of calibrated parameters in turn. The discount factor is assumed to
be equal across blocs and set to 0.99. We calibrate the relative size of the blocs according to
average relative population size in the euro area and U.S over the years 2001 to 2006. This
implies that EMU makes up about 51% of the population in both blocs. The substitution
elasticity between diﬀerent kinds of labour is set to 3 for both blocs. The import shares of
traded consumption goods are set to 0.10 in the euro area, taken from the new area wide
model and 0.09 for the US, taken from the Federal Reserve Board model, SIGMA . The
share of labour traded used for production of non-traded goods is set to 0.34 in the euro
area and 0.28 in the U.S.-bloc. Further we assume that 80% of all goods, be they traded
or non-traded, are going to consumption.
As regards price setting we choose to set all Calvo contract lengths to four quarters
but estimate the degree of indexation. However due to possible identiﬁcation problems
we assume that all ﬁrms, i.e. PCP- and LCP-ﬁrms, apply the same degree of indexation
in each bloc. We also assume that price setters in each bloc are hit by the same markup
shocks.
Consumption and labour supply elasticities are calibrated as well and set σ = σ∗ = ϕ =
ϕ∗ = 2. The substitution elasticities between traded and non-traded goods are calibrated
to 1.5 and the substitution elasticities between home and foreign traded goods are set to
2 in each bloc respectively. Finally, as the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the real exchange rate turned
out to be very persistent we calibrated this value to 0.99.
3.3 Priors
We have 50 remaining parameters to estimate and assume a priori that the parameters are
independent of each other and apply the following general convention. For all parameters
that should lie in the unit interval a beta density is chosen as a prior. For the standard
20deviations of the innovations we choose fairly uninformative inverted gamma densities
and for the remaining parameters we formulate our subjective beliefs about location and
uncertainty in terms of normal densities. For a full overview see the column ´prior’ in
Tables 1 to 3 below.
3.4 Results
The results in Tables 1 to 3 are obtained from maximizing the posterior mode as well as
calculating the mean from 500 000 Metropolis-Hastings simulations to approximate the
posterior density. Overall diﬀerences between the two blocs are not big, though there
are notable diﬀerences. We note that price indexation for traded goods does not play an
important role whereas it is more important for price indexation for non-traded goods
with a much higher value in the euro area. This is also the case for wage indexation in
the euro areas vs the U.S. Across both blocs it turns out that the fraction of PCP-price
setters is very small, only about 1% of the ﬁrms set prices in the producer currency.
The notable diﬀerences between the two blocs are as follows: consumption habit in the
US is far higher than for EMU pointing to a higher degree of output persistence in that
bloc. By contrast indexation in the non-traded sector and for wages is far higher EMU
indicating a higher degree of non-traded goods inﬂation and wages in that bloc. All shocks
are very persistent with small diﬀerences between blocs. The most important supply-side
shocks in terms of the standard deviation of the white noise components are for labour
supply, non-traded goods technology, and the mark-up in the non-traded sector. For all
these shocks EMU is more volatile than the US. Most of the other parameters estimates
are relatively similar across blocs. Taken as a whole the diﬀerences between the two blocs
suggest a stronger role for stabilization in EMU than the US.
21Structural Parameters Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Std Mode Mean 5/95% Interval
Calvo employment EMU ξe beta 0.750 0.100 0.727 0.735 0.697 0.770
Indexation PCP/LCP EMU γH beta 0.500 0.150 0.047 0.058 0.023 0.107
Indexation PCP/LCP US γℓ∗
H beta 0.500 0.150 0.095 0.113 0.047 0.204
Indexation wage setters EMU γW beta 0.500 0.150 0.529 0.402 0.208 0.600
Indexation wage setters US γ∗
W beta 0.500 0.150 0.267 0.373 0.181 0.583
Indexation nontraded goods EMU γN beta 0.500 0.150 0.739 0.615 0.361 0.821
Indexation nontraded goods US γ∗
N beta 0.500 0.150 0.305 0.360 0.164 0.586
Habit EMU h beta 0.500 0.150 0.455 0.475 0.372 0.579
Habit US h∗ beta 0.500 0.150 0.670 0.657 0.551 0.766
PCP-fraction EMU θ beta 0.500 0.200 0.012 0.018 0.004 0.039
PCP-fraction US θ∗ beta 0.500 0.200 0.014 0.024 0.006 0.050
Taylor rule inﬂation EMU fπ norm 1.500 0.200 1.682 1.517 1.235 1.839
Taylor rule output EMU fy norm 0.500 0.200 0.518 0.229 0.043 0.560
Taylor rule interest rate EMU fr beta 0.700 0.200 0.842 0.871 0.836 0.900
Taylor rule inﬂation US f∗
π norm 1.500 0.200 1.201 1.495 1.225 1.772
Taylor rule output US f∗
y norm 0.500 0.200 0.488 0.525 0.359 0.731
Taylor rule lagged interest rate US f∗
r beta 0.700 0.200 0.819 0.814 0.756 0.866
Table 1. Structural Parameters
Shock processes - Persistence Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Std Mode Mean 5/95% Interval
Cons. preference EMU ρc beta 0.850 0.100 0.880 0.900 0.849 0.938
Cons. preference US ρ∗
c beta 0.850 0.100 0.843 0.842 0.734 0.915
Labour supply EMU ρL beta 0.850 0.100 0.952 0.950 0.923 0.976
Labour supply US ρ∗
L beta 0.850 0.050 0.928 0.857 0.691 0.956
Techn. traded goods EMU ρaT beta 0.850 0.100 0.909 0.914 0.854 0.992
Techn. traded goods US ρ∗
aT beta 0.850 0.100 0.977 0.976 0.955 0.993
Techn. nontraded goods EMU ρaN beta 0.850 0.100 0.997 0.989 0.973 0.998
Techn. nontraded goods US ρ∗
aN beta 0.850 0.100 0.937 0.935 0.892 0.974
Government expenditure EMU ρg beta 0.850 0.100 0.940 0.945 0.910 0.974
Government expenditure US ρ∗
g beta 0.850 0.100 0.980 0.978 0.957 0.994
ROW oil ρROW beta 0.850 0.100 0.837 0.870 0.768 0.949
Table 2. Persistence of Shocks
22Prior Posterior
Parameter Type Mean Dof Mode Mean Interval
Cons pref EMU ǫC invg 0.670 4.000 0.421 0.434 0.354 0.527
Cons pref US ǫ∗
C invg 0.670 4.000 0.457 0.475 0.384 0.586
Labour pref EMU ǫL invg 3.000 4.000 2.325 2.530 1.848 3.341
Labour pref US ǫ∗
L invg 3.000 4.000 1.425 1.756 1.035 2.765
Tech. traded goods EMU ǫaT invg 0.600 4.000 0.256 0.317 0.175 0.552
Tech. traded goods US ǫ∗
aT invg 0.600 4.000 0.329 0.486 0.207 0.914
Tech. nontraded goods EMU ǫaN invg 0.600 4.000 0.840 0.928 0.749 1.133
Tech. nontraded goods US ǫ∗
aN invg 0.600 4.000 0.660 0.653 0.557 0.750
Gov exp EMU ǫG invg 2.000 4.000 2.388 2.511 2.007 3.014
Gov exp US ǫ∗
G invg 2.000 4.000 4.095 4.180 3.664 4.790
Oil shock ROW ǫROW invg 0.300 4.000 0.278 0.268 0.201 0.334
Wage markup EMU ǫW invg 0.500 4.000 0.122 0.141 0.119 0.164
Wage markup US ǫ∗
W invg 0.500 4.000 0.232 0.235 0.207 0.267
Risk premium ǫE invg 1.400 4.000 0.368 0.381 0.332 0.434
Monetary policy EMU ǫR invg 0.200 4.000 0.092 0.166 0.064 0.432
Monetary policy US ǫ∗
R invg 0.200 4.000 0.092 0.178 0.066 0.459
Markup traded goods EMU ǫπH invg 0.500 4.000 0.180 0.178 0.139 0.220
Markup traded goods US ǫ∗
πF invg 2.000 4.000 0.321 0.306 0.263 0.354
Markup nontraded goods EMU ǫπN invg 0.500 4.000 0.398 0.416 0.360 0.482
Markup nontraded goods US ǫ∗
πN invg 0.500 4.000 0.264 0.276 0.160 0.414
Correlation between techn. σaT a∗
T norm 0.740 0.200 0.707 0.691 0.440 0.935
Table 3. Standard Deviations of Shocks
4 LQ Approximation and Equilibrium Concepts
We focus exclusively on monetary policy where the monetary authorities can commit.19
We consider one or two Ramsey planners, for the cooperative and non-cooperative prob-
lems respectively, choosing monetary instruments to maximize household welfare in an
environment consisting of a decentralized economy with possibly large distortions in the
19Levine and Pearlman (2007) consider further discretionary equilibria where commitment to the private
sector is not possible.
23zero-inﬂation steady state. As shown in Levine et al. (2007b), the procedure for achieving
an accurate LQ approximation for each optimization problem is as follows20:
1. Deﬁne the optimization problem for the Ramsey planner. For the cooperation this
is a standard problem. For non-cooperative games we need to deﬁne the appropriate
equilibrium concept. Our ultimate aim is to obtain an accurate quadratic approx-
imation of welfare for the state-space representation of the game, (89) and (90).
Since interest-rates are given in this representation, we choose an open-loop Nash
equilibrium in interest-rate paths for the purposes of the approximation.
2. Set out the deterministic non-linear form of each Ramsey problem, to maximize the
representative agents utility subject to non-linear dynamic constraints.
3. Write down the single Lagrangian for the cooperative problem, and the Lagrangians
for the two blocs for the non-cooperative problem. For the cooperative problem it is
assumed that the single Ramsey planner maximizes a weighted sum of the expected
utilities of the representative households in the two blocs using population ratios
as the weights. Associated with each Lagrangian is a Hamiltonian consisting of the
utility and a sum of all appropriately expressed constraints for the decentralized
economy time multipliers.
4. Calculate the ﬁrst order conditions. We do not require the initial conditions for
an optimum since we ultimately only need the steady-state about which we are
approximating.
5. Calculate the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions. The terminal condition
implied by this procedure is that the system converges to this steady state.
6. Calculate a second-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
Hamiltonian associated with the Lagrangian or Lagrangians in 3.
7. Calculate a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
ﬁrst-order conditions and the original constraints.
20MATLAB software to implement this procedure is in preparation and will be available on request from
the authors.
248. Use 5. to eliminate the steady-state Lagrangian multipliers in 6. By appropriate
elimination both the Hamiltonian and the constraints can be expressed in minimal
form.
To be more speciﬁc, let us consider the general deterministic dynamic programming




βt[U(Xt−1,Wt) s.t. Xt = f(Xt−1,Wt) (91)
where Xt and Wt are vectors of state vector and instrument respectively, which has a





t (Xt − f(Xt−1,Wt))] (92)
If the solution to this problem tends to a steady state, it is easy to show that this steady
state { ¯ X, ¯ W, ¯ λ} satisﬁes the steady-state ﬁrst-order conditions:
UW + λT
t fW = 0 UX −
1
β
¯ λT + ¯ λTfX = 0 (93)
If we now expand (92) about the steady state, then all ﬁrst-order terms are zero, while





t (∆Xt − ∆f(Xt−1,Wt))] (94)





βt∇2H s.t. ∆Xt = ∆f(Xt−1,Wt) (95)
which is what we think of as the LQ approximation.
In fact, the set of nonlinear constraints are slightly more complicated than this, in
that the lead terms may be a function of several lead terms, and there are also static
relationship. Thus for example, the nonlinear equations that deﬁne the domestic inﬂation
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H,t−1 + (1 − ξH)Q
1−ζ
t (98)
where ΠH,t is the gross inﬂation rate, and Ht,Λt,Qt are deﬁning variables that are elim-
inated from the linear approximation. However, the basic approach outlined above is





H,t Ht+1,t in the Hamiltonian.
This then gives us the accurate LQ approximation of the original non-linear optimiza-
tion problem in the form of a minimal linear state-space representation of the constraints
and a quadratic form of the utility expressed in terms of the states. The quadratic form of
the utility function obtained for the cooperative Ramsey planners is then appropriate for
cooperative LQ games irrespective of the monetary instrument, although we use interest
rates as the instrument. For the non-cooperative problem, where there is more than one
policymaker, we obtain an analogous LQ approximation; in this case, each policymaker
has its own set of steady state Lagrange multipliers, so the the quadratic approximations
to the utility functions diﬀer not merely due to the diﬀering objectives of the two poli-
cymakers but also because of the diﬀerent weights on the constraints. These quadratic
approximations obtained for the non-cooperative Ramsey planners are then appropriate
for for non-cooperative LQ games.





























Letting the population weights be [ω,1 − ω], it is important to note that in general the
cooperative loss function is not a simple linear sum of the non-cooperative ones as is
commonly assumed in the literature; i.e.,
ΩC
0  = ωΩ0 + (1 − ω)Ω∗
0 (102)
26To get some idea about the objectives of the policymakers from the perspective of
the LQ approximation, we can examine the elements of the square matrix that multiplies
percentage deviations of the variables from their steady-state values. Given that this is
a 49 × 49 matrix, it is more useful to gain some idea of the policy tradeoﬀs by listing
the largest diagonal elements; we present these as positive numbers so as to represent wel-
fare losses. Since EMU and the US have approximately equal populations, we put ω = 0.5.
Weight on Coop Non-Coop Euro Non-Coop US
c 4 8 -1
c∗ 14 -3 30
π 156 249 24
π∗ 184 36 306
πH 11 21 2
π∗
F 16 3 28
πN 33 74 -4
π∗
N 61 5 112
wr − wr−1 145 256 34
wr∗ − wr∗
−1 184 43 326
πF 24 29 98
π∗
H -63 26 16
π
p
F 17 22 23
π
p∗
H -47 19 12
Table 4. Largest weights on squares of variables under cooperation, and for
each bloc under non-cooperation
As can seen from this table, the weights on consumption deviations are easily outweighed
by those on inﬂation, and particularly by CPI inﬂation and real wage inﬂation. Also note
in this table that the weights under cooperation are not equal to the average of those
under non-cooperation as noted in (102). Given the heavy weighting of inﬂation and real
wage inﬂation, one would expect that an interest-rate rule based on one or both of these
is likely to be very eﬀective at stabilizing welfare.
27We can now deﬁne the three LQ games and equilibria used in the rest of the paper:
Optimal Policy: Cooperation with Commitment: OPTCC
A single Ramsey planner maximizes ΩC
0 given by (101) with respect to {it},{i∗
t} subject
to the state-space representation (89) and (90).
Simple Rule: Cooperation with Commitment: SIMCC
A single Ramsey planner maximizes ΩC
0 given by (101) subject to simple feedback con-
straints it = Dyt and i∗
t = D∗yt and to the state-space representation (89) and (90), with
respect to D,D∗.
Simple Rule: Non-Cooperation with Commitment: SIMNC
The home Ramsey planner maximizes Ω0 given by (99) subject to simple feedback con-
straints it = Dyt and to the state-space representation (89) and (90), with respect to D,
given i∗
t = D∗yt. In a closed-loop Nash equilibrium the foreign Ramsey planner chooses
D∗ in an analogous fashion.
Details of these equilibria are provided in Appendix A.
5 The Zero Lower Bound Constraint
Following Woodford (2003), chapter 6, Levine et al. (2007c) and Levine et al. (2008), we
can impose an eﬀect that approximates the interest-rate ZLB constraint by modifying
the LQ optimization problems. For the non-cooperative game, this is implemented as a
constraint on the variance of the interest rate by modifying the home and foreign blocs




































As explained in Levine et al. (2008), for the non-cooperative game, the home optimiza-
tion problem is to choose an unconditional distribution for it (i.e., at the steady-state, such
that the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is very low. This is im-
plemented by calibrating the weight wi so that z0(p)σi < I where z0(p) is the critical value
28of a standard normally distributed variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p, I = 1
β −1+¯ π is
the zero-inﬂation, steady-state nominal interest rate and σi is the unconditional variance.
An analogous choice of w∗
i applies to the foreign bloc. For the cooperative game the single
Ramsey planner chooses (wi,w∗
i) so that the ZLB constraint is satisﬁed in both blocs,
though it may only bind in one bloc.21
The stages of the interest-rate rule cooperative and non-cooperative games with a ZLB
constraint are as follows:
1. For the cooperative rules (wi,w∗
i ) are chosen jointly so that the the probability of
hitting the ZLB is p or less in both blocs. For the non-cooperative rules, EMU
chooses wi given w∗
i such that the probability of hitting the ZLB is p or less. EU
similarly chooses w∗
i given wi. The intersection of the reaction functions wi = f(w∗
i)
and w∗
i = f(wi) is the Nash equilibrium in interest-rate penalties at stage 1 of the
game.
2. Now given (wi,w∗
i), for the cooperative rules the two blocs jointly choose rules to
minimize a joint welfare loss function (that incorporates the ZLB constraints). For
non-cooperative rules, EMU choose an welfare-optimum feedback interest-rate rule
to minimize its welfare loss (that again incorporates its own ZLB constraint) given
the rule in the US. The US acts in an analogous way resulting in a closed-loop Nash
equilibrium at stage 2 of the game.
3. Given the rules designed at stage 2 both countries responds to shocks in accordance
with these rules.
21The ZLB constraint can be further eased by shifting the interest rate distribution to the right. Then
steady state inﬂation rate in the optimal policy is positive. Let ¯ π > 0 be this rate. Then I =
1
β − 1 + π
∗
is the steady state nominal interest rate. Given σr the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure





×100,0]. Furthermore if π
∗ is chosen
in a optimal fashion, it is a credible new steady state inﬂation rate. (See Levine et al. (2007c)). In this
paper however we retain zero inﬂation as a steady state feature of the policy rules.
296 Coordination Gains without Model Uncertainty
6.1 Results with no ZLB Constraint
First let us ignore the ZLB constraint. Table 5 presents results for this case. We consider
three forms of simple commitment rules. The ﬁrst feed back from current CPI inﬂation
in each bloc and take the form






and the second includes a feedback from wage inﬂation:








Finally we consider a rule close to the standard inﬂation - output gap rule. Since there
are two sectors, traded and non-traded goods, and two outputs we use an employment gap,
the diﬀerence between employment with sticky prices and imperfect ﬁnancial markets and
that with ﬂexible prices and perfect ﬁnancial markets, as the target variable. Denoting
this by egapt the rule takes the form








As before we denote by SIMCC the coordinated optimized simple rule of this type
whilst SIMNC denotes the corresponding closed-loop Nash game in interest-rate rules
between the countries. We compare the outcomes of these equilibria with the optimal
coordination and commitment rule, OPTCC. ce is the percentage consumption permanent
equivalent loss in the US from sub-optimal rules compared with OPT. Throughout the
paper, we adopt a conditional welfare loss measure, starting at the zero-inﬂation steady
state (see Appendix A). Let (Ω0 + Ω∗
0)i, i = SIMCC, SIMNC, OPT be the expected




k × 10−2 where k = (C(1 − h))1−σ ≃ 2 for central parameter values.
In table 5 we ﬁrst consider the interest volatilities across the various equilibria which
are measures of the degree of monetary policy activism required to minimize the expected
30welfare loss function. We denote by var(it) the steady-state conditional variance of the
nominal interest rate. For OPTCC these are very high and higher in EMU than in the
US. This is as one would expect from the estimated parameter diﬀerences noted in section
3. For such values there is a large probability per period of violating the ZLB indicated
in the ﬁnal column of 0.31 and 0.25 in EMU and the US respectively.22
For equilibrium SIMCC there is very little diﬀerence in outcomes across our three forms
of simple feedback rule. Moreover the interest-rate variances are far lower indicating that
being restricted to such rules considerably reduces the welfare gains from stabilization by
the use of the nominal interest rate. The cost of simplicity is signiﬁcant, around 0.6%
in consumption equivalent terms. Violations of the ZLB are not serious for cooperative
simple rules, but the rules are severely sub-optimal. Once we turn to non-cooperative
simple rules however this feature changes remarkably. Now countries have a incentive
to manipulate the terms of trade in their favour in a direction dependent on the shocks
hitting their economies. Each country then designs a more active rule that constitutes a
closed-loop Nash equilibrium in feedback rules but has a beggar-thy-neighbour character.
As a consequence the gains from cooperation are high varying from 0.53% for the CPI
infaltion rule to 0.78 for the rule that also responds to wage inﬂation.
6.2 Imposing the ZLB Constraint
The results obtained without ZLB considerations follow most of the coordination gains
literature. In our set-up there are two sources of gains from coordinating monetary policy.
First, as we have seen in section 4, the approximate quadratic loss function are diﬀerent
for the cooperative and non-cooperative games and the former is not a simple linear
combination of the latter. Second there is the familiar terms of trade externality that
encourages beggar-thy-neighbour policies. From the work of Canzoneri et al. (2005), Liu
and Pappa (2005) and others we know that a non-traded sector add a relative price of
trade to non-traded goods eﬀect that can magnify the unilateral beneﬁts of terms of trade
changes. We then appear to conﬁrm the literature that suggests the coordination gains
can be quite large in richer models with these features.
22Note that we needed to choose wi = w
∗
i = 1.6 in OPTCC to obtain a solution. For simple rules there
are no computational problems with putting wi = w
∗
i = 0.
31However this conclusion is premature because our non-cooperative rules involve a severe
violation of the ZLB constraint and are therefore not operational. As described in section
5, we now modify the policy rules to incorporate a ZLB constrain with a low probability
per period of p = 0.02 or less of hitting the ZLB. Table 6 shows the results for same
policy rules as in Table 5. Three features of the results are particularly notable. First,
the costs of simplicity are much smaller with the ZLB constraint imposed. Second, owing
to the asymmetries in the estimated model in a number of cases we have equilibria where
the ZLB constraint only binds in the EMU. Third, and most importantly, the gains from
policy coordination are much smaller with ZLB considerations, down to consumption
equivalent gains of 0.03, 0.01 and 0.07 for the CPI, wage inﬂation and employment gap
rules respectively. The conclusion we draw from these results is: rather than cooperate in
the details of the rule, countries can simply agree to adopt a rule that responds to CPI and
wage inﬂation.23
In order to understand the workings of the model under cooperative rules, we now
examine the responses under the optimal rule OPTCC and SIMCC in Table 6 to common
1% shocks to total factor productivity in the traded sector (AN(0) = AN(0)∗ = 1) and to
government spending (G(0) = G∗(0) = 1). Figures 1 and 2 show the simulations.
Consider ﬁrst the supply-side shocks in the non-traded sectors. The features that
OPTCC and the SIMCC rules have in common are a rise in output in the non-traded
sectors, a corresponding fall in the traded sectors a switch facilitated on the demand
side by a fall in the relative prices of non-traded and traded goods in the two blocs (nt,
n∗
t), a rise in consumption and a fall in CPI inﬂation. The rise in non-traded output is
sluggish and never achieves the productivity increase of 1% because some of the beneﬁt
of this benign supply-side shock results in households taking more leisure. The relevant
asymmetry between the two blocs for these shocks is the greater persistence of the TFP
non-traded shock in EMU resulting in a more persistent output eﬀect for that bloc.
To understand movements in the real exchange rate (and the related terms of trade)
consider the following linearization of the modiﬁed UIP condition (55):
rert = Etrert+1 + Et(r∗
t − rt) − δrbF,t (112)
23Interestingly such a rule is implicitly advocated by a current member of the monetary policy committee
of the Bank of England, David Blanchﬂower (see Blanchﬂower and Shadforth (2007)).
32Solving (112) forward in time we see that the real exchange rate is a sum of future expected
real interest-rate US-EMU diﬀerentials plus a term proportional to the sum of future
expected net liabilities of EMU. The EMU real exchange will depreciate (a rise in rert) if
the sum of expected future US-EMU interest-rate diﬀerentials is positive and/or the sum
of expected future net liabilities are positive. The second asset eﬀect, a deviation from risk-
sharing, is shown in Figures 1 and 2 as rerd and is negative indicating an accumulation of
assets in EMU. However this eﬀect is oﬀset by a long-run interest-rate diﬀerential in favour
of the US causing the EMU real and nominal exchange rate to eventually depreciate.
After around 10 quarters, SIMCC closely mimics OPTCC for the non-traded goods
technology shocks but prior to that the nominal interest paths diﬀer in both blocs and
indeed the interest-rate diﬀerentials are of opposite sign. Turning to the government
spending shock, in Figure 2 we now see more prolonged diﬀerences between SIMCC and
OPTCC. Under the latter optimal regimes there is very nominal response in terms of
the interest rate and CPI inﬂation rate. Under SIMCC however, the interest rate falls in
both blocs with a diﬀerential in favour of EMU for 20 quarters. Again EMU accumulates
assets and its real exchange rate ﬁrst appreciates then depreciates as the interest-rate
diﬀerential moves in favour of the US. SIMCC does not closely mimic OPTCC even after
20 quarters for this shock. This serves to highlight the sense in which simple rules are
optimal: they are designed to minimize the expected welfare loss over the full range
of shocks. They are optimal only for the particular estimated persistence parameters
and standard deviations of white noise disturbances and are non-certainty equivalence:
diﬀerent estimates for standard deviations result in diﬀerent optimized rules. Responses to
some shocks can be severely sub-optimal as is clearly the case for this common government
spending shock.
7 Coordination Gains with Model Uncertainty
In this section we consider model uncertainty in the form of uncertain estimates of the
non-policy parameters of the model, Γ. Suppose the state of the world s is described by




















 + Csǫt (113)
33where zs
t is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and xt are non-predetermined
variables in state s of the world. For parameter-robust rules, (103) is replaced with the
average expected utility loss across a large number of draws, n, from all models constructed














A similar reformulation of the average expected utility applies to Ω∗
0 and ΩC
0 .
We use the draws from the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Bayesian estimation
as a representation of the ex post probability distribution of the parameters of the system.
The results that follow are based on n = 100 such draws. For each draw we use the
variance of the interest rate to calculate the probability of hitting the zero lower bound;
once again the average of these appears as Prob ZLB in the tables and the average variance
of these is included in the table as var(it). Thus with an equilibrium interest rate of 1%





















where Z(x) is the probability that a standard normal random variable has a value less
than x.
As we have found little improvement in rules that target wage inﬂation and the output
gap in addition to CPI inﬂation, in Table 7 we present the results for robust CPI inﬂa-
tion targeting rule only. Consumption equivalent losses are measured relative to SIMCC
without the ZLB. How do our robust rules compare with their non-robust counterparts of
Table 6? With or without a ZLB we see that SIMCC calls for far less activism when there
is model uncertainty, a result resembling that of Brainard (1967). With or without model
uncertainty, SIMNC is far more activist than SIMCC as each bloc seeks to use the ex-
change rate to its advantage. Cooperation prevents such beggar-thy-neighbour behaviour,
and when blocs cooperate to account for model uncertainty the beneﬁts from cooperation
grow substantially. With a ZLB, the consumption equivalent gain grows from 0.03% with-
out model uncertainty to to 0.41% with model uncertainty. We have then a new result:
34the gains from monetary policy coordination rise signiﬁcantly when CPI interest-rate rules
are designed to account for model uncertainty.
8 Conclusions
This paper has examined the the gains from monetary policy coordination in the design
of CPI inﬂation interest-rate rules using a developed NOEM ﬁtted to EMU-US data by
Bayesian-ML methods. We incorporate two novel features not found in coordination liter-
ature to date: the incorporation of a ZLB interest-rate constraint and model uncertainty.
Both these aspects have interesting consequences for the size of the gains from coordination
summarized in Table 8.
First we recall two sources of gains from coordinating monetary policy: approximate
quadratic loss functions that are diﬀerent for the cooperative and non-cooperative games
with the former not a simple linear combination of the latter, and the familiar terms
of trade externality that encourages beggar-thy-neighbour policies. From the existing
literature we know that a non-traded sector adds a relative price of traded to non-traded
goods eﬀect that can magnify the unilateral beneﬁts of terms of trade changes. From the
no-ZLB, no-model uncertainty cell of Table 8 we then appear to conﬁrm the literature
that suggests the coordination gains can be quite large in richer models with this feature.
But this result is misleading because interest-rate rules that ignore the ZLB constraint
are not operational. When the ZLB constraint is introduced, from the ZLB, no-model
uncertainty cell of Table 8 we see that the the scope for beggar-thy-neighbour exchange
rate policy under SIMNC is severely curtailed and the coordination gains become very
small. However adding the second aspect: the need to design robust rules in the face of
model uncertainty creates new incentives for exploiting the exchange rate channel under
SIMNC that increase the ineﬃciency of the Nash equilibrium compared with SIMCC. The
consequence is that even with a ZLB constraint the coordination gains become signiﬁcant.
This suggests a new result that may have general applicability to both monetary and
ﬁscal stabilization policy: the gains from coordination can rise signiﬁcantly when rules
are designed to account for model uncertainty. We have established such a result for CPI
inﬂation targeting interest-rate rules and a particular two-bloc model. Future research is
required to establish the more general proposition.
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A The Policy Rules
Consider ﬁrst the deterministic problem. Substituting out for outputs, the state-space












where zt is an (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables including non-stationary
processes, z0 is given, wt = [it,i∗
t]T is a vector of policy variables, xt is an m× 1 vector of
non-predetermined variables and xe
t+1,t denotes rational (model consistent) expectations
of xt+1 formed at time t. Then xe
t+1,t = xt+1 and letting yT
t = [zt,xt]T, (A.1) becomes
yt+1 = Ayt + Bwt (A.2)










The procedures for evaluating the three policy rules are outlined in the rest of this appendix
(or Currie and Levine (1993) for a more detailed treatment).
A.1 The Optimal Policy: Cooperation with Commitment (CC)
Consider the policy-maker’s ex-ante optimal policy at t = 0. This is found by minimizing
ΩC





t QCyt + wT
t Rwt) +  t+1(Ayt + Bwt − yt+1) (A.4)
where  t is a row vector of costate variables. By standard Lagrange multiplier theory we
minimize




41with respect to the arguments of L0 (except z0 which is given). Then at the optimum,
L0 = ΩC
0 .
Redeﬁning a new costate vector pt = β−1 T
t , the ﬁrst-order conditions lead to
wt = −R−1βBTpt+1 (A.6)
βATpt+1 − pt = −QCyt (A.7)

















To complete the solution we require 2n boundary conditions for (A.8). Specifying z0






βtpt = 0 (A.9)
and the initial condition








is partitioned so that p1t is of dimension (n − m) × 1. Equation
(??), (A.6), (A.8) together with the 2n boundary conditions constitute the system under
optimal control.


























































partitioned so that S11 is (n − m) × (n − m) and S22 is m × m is the solution to the
steady-state Ricatti equation
S = QC + FTRF + β(A − BF)TS(A − BF) (A.16)







where Zt = ztzT
t . To achieve optimality the policy-maker sets p20 = 0 at time t = 0. At
time t > 0 there exists a gain from reneging by resetting p2t = 0. It can be shown that
N22 < 0, so the incentive to renege exists at all points along the trajectory of the optimal
policy. This is the time-inconsistency problem.
A.2 Optimized Simple Commitment Rules (SIMCC and SIMNC)
We now consider simple sub-optimal rules of the form






where D is constrained to be sparse in some speciﬁed way. Rule (A.18) can be quite
general. By augmenting the state vector in an appropriate way it can represent a PID
(proportional-integral-derivative)controller (though the paper is restricted to a simple pro-
portional controller only).









where P = QC + DTRD. The system under control (A.1), with wt given by (A.18), has
a rational expectations solution with xt = −Nzt where N = N(D). Hence
yT
t Pyt = zT
t Tzt (A.20)
where T = P11 − NTP21 − P12N + NTP22N, P is partitioned as for S in (A.15) onwards
and
zt+1 = (G11 − G12N)zt (A.21)
where G = A + BD is partitioned as for P. Solving (A.21) we have
zt = (G11 − G12N)tz0 (A.22)










where Zt = ztzT
t and V satisﬁes the Lyapunov equation
V = T + HTV H (A.24)
43where H = G11 − G12N. At time t = 0 the optimized simple rule is then found by
minimizing Ω0 given by (A.23) with respect to the non-zero elements of D given z0 using
a standard numerical technique. An important feature of the result is that unlike the
previous solution the optimal value of D is not independent of z0. That is to say
D = D(z0)
For the non-cooperative case, in a closed-loop Nash equilibrium we assume each poli-
cymaker chooses rules wt = Dyt and w∗
t = D∗yt independently taking the rule of the other
bloc as given. The equilibrium is then computed by iterating between the two countries
until the solutions converge.
A.3 The Stochastic Case

















where ut is an n × 1 vector of white noise disturbances independently distributed with
cov(ut) = Σ. Then, it can be shown that certainty equivalence applies to all the policy
rules apart from the simple rules (see Currie and Levine (1993)). The expected loss at
time t is as before with quadratic terms of the form zT
t Xzt = tr(Xzt,ZT

























where Et is the expectations operator with expectations formed at time t.

































(A.27) and (A.28) are conditional welfare loss measures at time t given zt. The paper
reports conditional welfare losses at the steady state (zt = Zt = 0). An unconditional
welfare loss measure averages over all possible initial states using the distribution of states
calculated under the optimal commitment policy. These are obtained from (A.27) and
(A.28) by replacing Zt with the variance-covariance matrix cov(zt). However, for a discount
factor close to unity, the stochastic terms dominate so the diﬀerence between these two
measures is small.
44For the conditional welfare loss measures at time t = 0, the optimized cooperative
simple rule is found by minimizing ΩSIMCC









or, in other words, the optimized rule depends both on the initial displacement z0 and on
the covariance matrix of disturbances Σ. The non-cooperative rule for the stochastic case
follows in a similar way.
45Equilibrium Form of Rule (wi,w∗
i ) Loss ce(%) (var(it),var(i∗
t)) Pr ZLB
OPTCC complex (1.6, 1.6) 59.8 0 (3.96,2.11) (0.31,0.25)
SIMCC (ρ,θπ) = (0.83,0.31) (0,0) 180.6 0.60 (0.18.0.34) (0.01,0.06)
CPI Inﬂation (ρ∗,θ∗
π) = (0.6,1.19)
SIMNC (ρ,θπ) = (0.51,10.0) (0,0) 286 1.13 (2.67, 2.56) (0.27,0.26)
CPI Inﬂation (ρ∗,θ∗
π) = (0.64,10.0)
















Table 5. Gains from Coordination: No Model Uncertainty; no ZLB Constraint.
Equilibrium Form of Rule (wi,w∗
i ) Loss ce(%) (var(it),var(i∗
t)) Pr ZLB
OPTCC complex (4.6, 2.8) 111.8 0 (0.25,0.25) (0.02,0.02)
SIMCC (ρ,θπ) =(0.83,0.31) (0.0, 0.17) 181.7 0.35 (0.19.0.25) (0.02,0.02)
CPI Inﬂation (ρ∗,θ∗
π) = (0.72,0.84)
SIMNC (ρ,θπ) = (1.0,0.13) (0.59, 1.2) 189.1 0.38 (0.04,0.25) (0.00,0.02)
CPI Inﬂation (ρ∗,θ∗
π) = (0.93,1.06)
















Table 6. Gains from Coordination: No Model Uncertainty; ZLB Constraint Imposed.
46Equilibrium Form of Rule (wi,w∗
i ) Loss ce(%) (var(it),var(i∗
t)) Pr ZLB
SIMCC (No ZLB) (ρ,θπ) =(0.81,0.2) (0.0, 0.0) 27.7 0 (0.74.2.53) (0.12,0.264)
CPI Inﬂation (ρ∗,θ∗
π) = (0.433,10)
SIMNC (No ZLB) (ρ,θπ) = (0.94,0.12) (0.0, 0.0) 114.3 0.43 (0.06,2.22) (0.00,0.25)
CPI Inﬂation (ρ∗,θ∗
π) = (0.97,10)








Table 7. Gains from Coordination: Robust Rules with Model Uncertainty; with and
without ZLB
No ZLB Constraint ZLB Constraint
No Model Uncertainty 0.53 0.03
Model Uncertainty 0.43 0.41
Table 8. Summary of Gains from Coordination in Consumption Equivalent Terms (%)






















































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a 1% Non-Traded Good Technology Shock




























































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a 1% Government Spending Shock
49